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for the District of New Jersey 
 
(D.C. No. 1-06-cr-00829-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable Joseph H. Rodriguez 
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BEFORE:  HARDIMAN, SCIRICA, and NYGAARD, 
Circuit Judges 
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OPINION 
__________ 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Richard Banks appeals the sentence that resulted from 
violating the terms of his supervised release by committing 
bank fraud.  He asserts that the appellate waiver in his plea 
agreement does not apply to the District Court’s decision to 
sentence him to a consecutive term of imprisonment for the 
supervised release violation.  We will affirm.   
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 During Banks’ supervised release in 2011 for a bank 
fraud conviction, police arrested him for conspiring to steal or 
create more than 75 fraudulent checks in the attempted theft 
of more than $130,000.  Pursuant to a plea agreement, he 
pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit bank 
fraud (18 U.S.C. §1349), and to violating the conditions of his 
supervised release.  He stipulated that he committed a Grade 
A violation of his supervised release, and that his total 
Guidelines offense level was 14 with a Criminal History 
Category of VI.  The plea agreement contained the following 
language: 
The sentence to be imposed upon 
Richard Banks is within the sole 
discretion of the sentencing judge, 
subject to the provisions of the 
Sentencing Reform Act, 18 
U.S.C. § 3551-3742, and the 
sentencing judge’s consideration 
of the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines. . . . The sentencing 
judge may impose any reasonable 
sentence up to and including the 
statutory maximum term of 
imprisonment and the maximum 
statutory fine.  This office cannot 
and does not make any 
representation or promise as to 
what guideline range may be 
found by the sentencing judge, or 
as to what sentence Richard 
Banks ultimately will receive.   
 
Plea Agreement § A.  It also stated: 
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The sentencing judge may order 
that any sentences imposed by the 
sentencing judge on the violation 
of 18 U.S.C. § 1349, as described 
in the Information, and the 
violation of supervised release as 
charged in Violation #1 to the 
Violation Petition, be served 
consecutively to each other or to 
any other sentence Richard Banks 
may be serving at the time the 
sentences are imposed pursuant to 
18 U.S.C. § 3584 and U.S.S.G. § 
7B1.3(f). 
 
Plea Agreement, Section B.  Finally, it declared: 
 
Richard Banks knows that he has, 
and voluntarily waives, the right 
to file any appeal . . . which 
challenges the sentence imposed 
by the sentencing court if that 
sentence falls within or below the 
Guidelines range that results from 
the agreed total Guidelines 
offense level of 14 and the 
sentence for the Violation Petition 
falls within or below the 
Guideline range set forth in 
Paragraphs 10 and 11 above. 
 
Plea Agreement, Schedule A, Paragraph 12.   
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 Between the time of his arrest and guilty plea, Banks 
cooperated with the Government quite substantially, resulting 
in a number of convictions.  At sentencing, after granting a 6-
level downward departure for this cooperation, the District 
Court imposed a prison term of 18 months for the bank 
fraud.
1
  It denied his requests for the same downward 
departure, and for a concurrent term of imprisonment, on the 
supervised release violation.  The District Court ordered 33 
months’ imprisonment for the violation, to be served 
consecutively.
2
  Banks now argues that his consecutive 
sentence is not encompassed in the waiver of his appellate 
rights.   
 
 We exercise plenary review to determine whether 
Banks’ issue falls within the scope of his appellate wavier.  
United States v. Castro, 704 F.3d 125, 135 (3d Cir. 2013).  
“We decline to exercise jurisdiction over the appeal where [1] 
the issues on appeal fall within the scope of the waiver and 
[2] the defendant knowingly and voluntarily agreed to the 
waiver, unless [3] enforcing the waiver would work a 
miscarriage of justice.”  Id. (quoting United States v. 
Saferstein, 673 F.3d 237, 242 (3d Cir. 2012)(internal 
quotation marks omitted)).  Banks concedes that he 
knowingly and voluntarily consented to the waiver. 
 
                                              
1
 The adjusted offense level  was 8, with a Guidelines range 
of 18 to 24 months. 
 
2
 The Guidelines range was 33 to 41 months.  U.S.S.G. § 
7B1.4(a).  The statutory maximum term, however, was 36 
months. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)).   
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 We construe the language of an appellate waiver 
strictly.  United States v. Khattak, 273 F.3d 557, 562 (3d Cir. 
2001).  “[W]e will review the merits of an appeal if the 
waiver expressly provides specific exceptions under which an 
appeal may be taken, provided the appeal implicates one of 
those exceptions.”  United States v. Jackson, 523 F.3d 234, 
242 (3d Cir. 2008).  Here, we find no basis for Banks to claim 
that either party intended to except consecutive sentencing 
from his broadly inclusive waiver of “any appeal . . . which 
challenges the sentence imposed.”  Plea Agreement, Schedule 
A, Par. 12.  To the contrary, Section B of the plea agreement 
explicitly anticipated that the District Court could impose a 
consecutive sentence.  Moreover, U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(f) 
conveys a strong preference for a consecutive sentence in 
precisely the scenario encountered here.  Finally, we must 
construe the phrase “any appeal . . . which challenges the 
sentence imposed” to mean what it plainly states.  See Castro, 
704 F.3d at 137.  Since consecutive sentencing is not 
explicitly excepted from the appellate waiver in this 
agreement, we conclude that the waiver covers the District 
Court’s imposition of a consecutive term of 33 months’ 
imprisonment for the supervised release violation.  
 
 Banks next argues that the language of the plea 
agreement is ambiguous, focusing upon the following 
statement:  “The sentencing judge may order that any 
sentences imposed . . . be served consecutively.”  Plea 
Agreement § B (emphasis added).  He asserts that this 
language is vague and susceptible to multiple meanings 
because the government never specifically expressed its intent 
to ask for a consecutive sentence.  Such a declaration was 
necessary in this case, he contends, because the plea 
agreement memorialized negotiations involving two federal 
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offenses.  He insists that, as a result of the lacuna created by 
the ambiguous language, he was not sufficiently on notice to 
seek an exception to his appellate waiver.  We disagree that 
any such ambiguity exists.  The word “may” accurately 
described the reality facing Banks:  the District Court had 
discretion to impose consecutive sentences and the 
government lacked authority to dictate how it would rule.  
The fact that the agreement encompassed both the bank fraud 
and supervised release offenses did not obscure the distinct 
possibility that the District Court would impose a consecutive 
sentence.  This did not disadvantage Banks in negotiating his 
plea agreement.   
 
 Finally, we understand Banks’ unreasonableness 
argument to assert that imposition of this sentence would be a 
miscarriage of justice.  Khattak, 273 F.3d at 562.  We have 
noted that, to set aside an otherwise valid waiver, certain 
factors should be considered:   
 
[T]he clarity of the error, its 
gravity, its character (e.g., 
whether it concerns a fact issue, a 
sentencing guideline, or a 
statutory maximum), the impact 
of the error on the defendant, the 
impact of correcting the error on 
the government, and the extent to 
which the defendant acquiesced in 
the result. 
 
 
Id.13- at 563 (quoting United States v. Teeter, 257 F.3d 14, 
26 (1st Cir. 2001)).  In this instance, Banks claims only that 
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the consecutive sentence is an excessive punishment for 
violating the court’s trust.  Yet, both of the prison terms 
imposed by the District Court were within the ranges 
specified in the plea agreement, and the entire term of 51 
months’ imprisonment was well below the statutory 
maximum of 30 years for the bank fraud offense.  18 U.S.C. § 
1344.  There is no foundation to conclude that the District 
Court’s sentence constituted a miscarriage of justice here.  
  
 For all of these reasons, we will enforce the waiver and 
affirm the sentence imposed by the District Court.    
